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Abstract
“If [voter] turnout was 100%, would it affect the election result?” (Bernhagen and Marsh
2007) is a frequently asked research question. So far, the question has been primarily an-
swered regarding the changes in the distribution of votes. This article extends the analysis
to changes in the distribution of seats and government formation. It proposes a method
that factors in apportionment methods, barring clauses, size of parliaments, leverage of
nonvoters, closeness of election results, and individual characteristics of nonvoters. The
method is then applied to German national elections from 1949 to 2005. The application
shows that Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) would have gained from the coun-
terfactual participation of nonvoters, although usually not enough to result in a government
change. However by the 1994 and 2005 elections evidence shows that such a government
change could have happened.
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ULRICH KOHLER
1 Introduction
“If turnout was 100%, would it affect the election result?” This question is the prelude of
an article by Bernhagen and Marsh (2007) that estimates the potential impact of nonvot-
ers on election results by means of a multiple imputation technique. The present article
extends this research question to the policy- relevant outcomes of election results and de-
scribes a method to estimate the impact of nonvoters on these outcomes. The proposed
method is then used to estimate the potential impact of nonvoters on German national
elections from 1949 to 2005.
The extension of the research question is as follows: “If turnout reached its maximum,
would it affect (a) parliamentary representation and (b) the government formation in a
parliamentary proportional system?” This reformulation differs from the above research
question in two respects. First, it refers not to a counterfactual situation of 100% turnout
but to the maximum level that could be achieved in a free and fair democratic election.
Since even in the Soviet Union turnout has never been 100%, this “maximum turnout”
provides a more realistic basis for estimating the potential effects of increased turnout.
Second, and more important, the reformulated research question does not deal with the
distribution of votes but with two specific election outcomes: the composition of the par-
liament and the formation of the government.
It is a commonplace in political sociology that an election consists not just of count-
ing votes (Powell 2000). The aim of proportional election laws is to have parliamentary
elections guarantee that the composition of the parliament proportionally represents the
distribution of interests in the society. In this respect, the “right” composition of the par-
liament is a goal in itself, and it would undermine the legitimacy of a political system if
massive absenteeism of parts of the electorate led to ongoing underrepresentation of spe-
cific interests in the parliament. Analyzing whether, and how much, the distribution of
seats in the parliament would have changed if nonvoters had participated in the election
helps in answering normative questions about the legitimacy of the political system.
Apart from the normative question, the composition of the parliament has numerous
highly practical policy consequences. In Germany, for example, the composition of the
parliament determines the parties that are allowed to send members to parliamentary com-
mittees, and in what number, the length of the time-slots for speeches in plenary and
committee meetings, and to some extent the funds available for the parliamentary groups.
However, the most important policy outcome of the parliament composition is the forma-
tion of the government. In terms of key policy outcomes, no other consequence of the
composition of the parliament comes even close to the decision of who governs, and who
does not.
Thus far, researchers who have analyzed the potential impact of increased turnout have
dealt solely with the effects on the distribution of votes; the results of these studies show
that the potential impact of nonvoters is small (Lutz and Marsh 2007). However, the
distribution of votes is only an input to the determination of the composition of the par-
liament, which in turn is an input to the process of government formation. Restricting
the analysis to the distribution of votes therefore stops short of analyzing the real-world
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policy consequences of nonvoting. For a more realistic picture, it is necessary to do the
final steps as well. The present analysis therefore departs from the work of authors such
as Bernhagen and Marsh (2007), by factoring in the specific regulations of the election
system, the closeness of the election, and the bargaining conditions of coalition formation.
The first part of the article describes a method for doing this in a systematic way, and the
second part illustrates the method with the case of German national elections since 1949.
2 Modeling the potential impact of nonvoters
2.1 Target quantities
The method proposed here estimates the potential impact of nonvoters on two target quan-
tities. The first target quantity is based on the share of parliamentary seats held by each
of the contending parties. When it comes to policy outcomes, the distribution of seats is
more important than the distribution of votes, from which it usually differs due to various
institutional mechanisms. One measure of the potential influence of nonvoters in terms
of the distribution of seats is the extent to which the realized number of seats for a party
differs from the number of seats for the same party under the counterfactual condition of
maximum turnout. Denoting the realized number of seats for party i as Si, and the counter-
factual number of seats for that party as S∗i , this target quantity can be formally expressed
as1
∆Si = Si−S∗i . (1)
In what follows, I refer to ∆Si as the “representation gap” for party i. A summary statistic
of the representation gap is attained following Bernhagen and Marsh’s use of the Gallagher
index of disproportionality (Gallagher 1991) by using
∆S=
I
∑
i=1
(
Si
S
− S
∗
i
S
)2
, (2)
where S is the overall number of seats in the parliament at the time of the respective
election. Equation (2) is the sum of the squared differences of the proportions of seats,
whereas Bernhagen and Marsh (2007: 552) used the sum of the squared differences of the
proportion of votes as their target quantity. Contrary to Bernhagen and Marsh’s approach,
a relatively strong difference in the vote proportion will not contribute to ∆S∗ as long as
the respective party remains below the barring clause set by the election law. At the same
time, even tiny differences in the proportion of votes could make a huge difference in the
representation gap, if these differences make one or several parties pass (or fall below) the
barring clause.
The second target quantity is based upon the idea that the ultimate outcome of an elec-
tion is the formation of a government. Therefore, the potential impact of nonvoters should
be operationalized as the probability that the counterfactual participation of nonvoters in
1 All formulas are written in terms of the specific election t. For the sake of simplicity, I forgo subscripting
the formulas with t.
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an election would lead to a different government that those actually formed after that elec-
tion. Using the letter O as the symbol for government outcome, a formalization of this
target quantity is
Pr∆O) = Pr(O 6= O∗) , (3)
where O denotes the realized government and O∗ denotes the government that would have
been formed if nonvoters had participated in that election. In what follows I refer to
Pr(∆O) as the probability of government change.
In a two-party parliamentary system the government is formed by the party with the
most seats in the parliament. A change in government will therefore take place if the win-
ning party becomes the runner-up under the counterfactual condition of maximum turnout.
However, two-party systems are exceptional in parliamentary systems. In multiparty sys-
tems, elections almost invariably result in no party winning an absolute majority of seats
in parliament. As a consequence, deciding who governs commonly requires bargaining
over the terms of a coalition cabinet or a minority government; coming first in seats in
parliament is not sufficient to guarantee a place in government (Kohler and Rose 2008: 8f;
Laver and Shepsle 1996). In a multiparty system, the probability of government change
can therefore be positive even if the counterfactual participation of nonvoters does not
change the order of parties in the parliament. For a nonzero probability of government
change, it is enough that nonvoters change the conditions of bargaining either to the ex-
tent that the realized government becomes algebraically impossible, or to the extent that
impossible coalitions become algebraically feasible. The conditions under which either
could occur differ slightly between the following four government types. These do not
exhaust every conceivable outcome, but they do represent the large majority of cases in
the election histories of advanced Western democracies.
Single-party government: a government formed by the party that won the absolute major-
ity of seats in the parliament. If the real election leads to a single-party government,
a substantial change in the bargaining conditions would occur if the winning party
lost its absolute majority. Therefore, the impact of nonvoters on government forma-
tion is defined as the probability that the winning party loses its absolute majority,
or, formally:
Pr(∆O|G= Single-party government) = Pr
(
S∗W <
1
2
S
)
, (4)
where the subscript S∗W denotes the counterfactual number of seats of the party that
won the real election.
Winner’s coalition: a coalition in which the winning party becomes the formateur of a
coalition cabinet. If the real election leads to a winner’s coalition, a substantial
change of the bargaining conditions would occur if (a) a runner-up party outpaced
the winning party, or (b) the realized coalition lost the absolute majority of seats
in the parliament, or (c) the winner of the counterfactual election gained absolute
majority on its own. Because these three counterfactual events are not disjunct, they
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cannot be easily combined into one single joint probability of government change.
For the sake of simplicity, it is proposed to use the maximum value of the three inde-
pendent probabilities of the above events as the probability of government change:
Pr(∆O|G= Winner’s coalition)
= max
(
Pr(S∗R > S
∗
W ) , Pr
(
S∗C <
1
2
S
)
, Pr
(
S∗W ∗ >
1
2
S
))
, (5)
where S∗R denotes the counterfactual number of seats of a “real-world” runner-up
party, S∗C denotes the counterfactual number of seats for the realized coalition, and
S∗W ∗ denotes the counterfactual number of seats for the winning party of the coun-
terfactual election.
Consent coalition: a coalition in which the formateur is not the party with the most votes.
In such a situation a change of the winning party in the counterfactual election will
not necessarily lead to different bargaining conditions. This will be the case only
if the realized coalition loses its majority of seats, or if one of the parties gains
an absolute majority on its own. Therefore, the probability of government change
becomes
Pr(∆O|G= Consent coalition)
= max
(
Pr
(
S∗C <
1
2
S
)
, Pr
(
S∗W ∗ >
1
2
S
))
, (6)
which is a subset of equation (5) above.
Minority government: a government formed by parties or coalitions that do not have the
absolute majority of seats. Minority governments appear when parties sense se-
rious barriers against forming arithmetically possible coalitions. The government
formation is much more a consequence of party decisions than of any of the other
situations. The only counterfactual election result that definitely changes the bar-
gaining conditions is when one party gains absolute majority on its own. Therefore,
the probability of government change becomes
Pr(∆O|G= Minority government) = Pr
(
S∗W ∗ >
1
2
S
)
. (7)
2.2 Estimation of the target quantities
Having defined how the potential influence of nonvoters should be conceptualized in prin-
cipal we now turn to the task of estimating these counterfactual quantities.
Representation gap
To quantify the representation gap, it is necessary to estimate the absolute number of
seats resulting from the counterfactual election. It is therefore necessary to estimate the
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distribution of votes of the counterfactual election, which in turn requires an estimation
of maximum turnout and of the voting behavior of nonvoters. Once the counterfactual
distribution of votes is known, it can be used as an input to the apportionment method,
which leads to a distribution of seats in the parliament. The following works backward
from the estimation of seats to the voting behavior of nonvoters.
The estimated absolute number of seats for party i is
Ŝ∗i = A
(
V̂∗
)
i
, (8)
where A(x) is the apportionment method. Typically, A(x) is the Hamilton method, the
Jefferson method, or the Webster method.2 The input to the apportionment method is V̂,
which denotes the vector of estimated absolute numbers of votes for all parties that passed
the barring clause, i.e.,
V̂∗ =
(
V̂ ∗1 . . . V̂ ∗i . . . V̂ ∗I
)
| V̂
∗i
V̂ ∗
> H (9)
with V̂ ∗i being the estimated absolute number of votes for party i in the counterfactual
election. V̂ ∗ is the estimated absolute number of valid votes in the counterfactual election,
which is ∑Ki=1 V̂ ∗i, i.e., the sum of the estimated number of votes for all K parties that
participated in the real election. H is the hurdle posed by the barring clause.
Hence, values for V̂ ∗i are needed. V̂ ∗i can be expressed as the sum of the realized valid
votes for party i and the estimated additional votes for that party from the nonvoters, i.e.,
V̂ ∗i =VVoteri +V̂ ∗
Non-voter
i . (10)
The term VVoteri in equation (10) is known from official publications of the electoral
authorities. An estimate must be obtained for V̂ ∗
Non-voter
i , the absolute number of nonvoter
votes for party i. To arrive at the estimation of V̂ ∗
Non-voter
i , assume for a moment that for
each individual nonvoter the probability of voting for party i were known from somewhere;
let me denote this probability with P̂r(y∗ = i)Non-voter. Now the estimation of additional
votes from the nonvoters for party i is straightforward:
V̂ ∗
Non-voter
i = P̂r(y
∗ = i)Non-voter×E× L̂ (11)
with P̂r(y∗ = i)Non-voter being the average of the estimated probability of voting by the
nonvoters for party i, E being the size of the electorate, and L̂ being the leverage, i.e.,
the proportion of the electorate that might additionally participate in the election. Alge-
braically, L̂ is the difference between the (estimated) maximum turnout and the observed
turnout of valid votes, i.e.,
L̂= T̂Max− V
E
. (12)
2 The Hamilton method is also known as the largest remainder method or Hare/Niemeyer method. The
Jefferson method is mathematically equivalent to the D’Hondt method, the Hagenbach-Bischoff method,
and the Bader-Ofer method. Finally, the Webster method is also known as the Sainte-Lague¨ method.
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The sole unknown quantity in equation (12) is the figure for maximum turnout. The the-
oretical limit of maximum turnout is 100%, but this limit cannot be reached in real-world
elections for many reasons (cf. Kohler and Rose 2008: 9–12). I do not set up an estimation
strategy for maximum turnout in a specific election here—this is left open for the applica-
tion in section 3. As a rule, one should generally expect maximum turnout to be higher if
the time lag between the compilation of the electoral register and the elections is short, if
the election laws allow postal voting, and if the ballot paper is simply designed. To give
some quantities for maximum turnout: Kohler and Rose (2008) have used the average
of valid turnout in the most recent parliamentary elections in European countries which
strongly enforce their compulsory voting law– -Belgium, Luxembourg, and Cyprus; this
average turned out to be 85%. In Australia, “the country with the oldest and probably the
most efficient system of compulsory voting” (Mackerras and McAllister 1999), the valid
turnout of the parliamentary election on November 24, 2007, was 91%.3
Let us now turn to the estimation of Pr(y∗ = i)Non-voter, the nonvoters’ probability of
voting for party i, which can be estimated only by making plausible assumptions. Here I
highlight the minimum assumptions to be made and propose a general strategy to estimate
that quantity on the basis of those assumptions. An example of how the estimation could
be performed with real data is introduced in section 3.
The most crucial assumption to be made is a model for voting behavior that is valid
for voters and nonvoters. Think of this model as some variant of the Michigan model of
voting behavior (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960; Miller and Shanks 1996), as some variant of
the economic theory of voting behavior (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981), or as some variant
of the interpersonal influence theory in the tradition of Lazarsfeld et al. (1948), Berelson
et al. (1954), or Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995). The fundamental commonality of all these
models is that individual voting behavior is a consequence of a weighted combination of
individual and contextual characteristics at the time of an election and some uncertainty;
formally,
Pr(y= i) = f (x,bi,εi) (13)
with x being a vector of characteristics, and bi being a vector of parameters that link the
characteristics to the probability of voting for party i. εi is a reminder for uncertainty.
Note that the model at this stage is not very restrictive. It determines neither any of the
characteristics in x nor a functional form between the probability of voting for party i and
the characteristics in x, nor does it assume that all of the characteristics equally influence
the probability of voting for parties. The only assumption here is that the model applies
to both voters and nonvoters. Without this assumption, estimation of the probability of
voting for party i of a specific nonvoter would be impossible. If the assumption is made,
the lessons learned from studying voters can be used for predicting the voting behavior of
nonvoters as follows:
P̂r(y∗ = i) = f
(
xNon- voter, b̂Voteri
)
. (14)
3 According to the Australian Government and Politics Database on http://elections.uwa.edu.
au/, the size of the registered electorate was 13,645,073, and the number of valid votes was 12,419,863.
PAGE 14
ULRICH KOHLER
In other words, one estimates bi for the characteristics x of the voters, and then replaces
the values for x by the values of the nonvoters. Essentially, it is said that a nonvoter who
has the same pattern as a voter on any of the characteristics that influence voting behavior
would have the same probability to vote for any party as this voter. Clearly, this strategy
is not new. Special cases of equation (14) are used in virtually any estimation of the
counterfactual voting behavior of nonvoters.
After having made the crucial assumption of equation (13), there is some freedom of
choice about the characteristics to include in x, about the estimation technique for the
parameters bi, and about the function that links the parameters and characteristics with
Pr(y= i). Obviously, one ought to use characteristics that strongly predict voting behav-
ior. One should also apply an estimation technique for the parameters bi that leads to good
estimates, and one should choose for f (x) a function that does not lead to nonsensical
estimates of P̂r(y∗ = i). However, all this is limited by the availability of data. It follows
from equation (14) that the characteristics used for x must have been observed for both
voters and nonvoters. One might be tempted to use information on voting intention in
pre-election surveys to estimate bi, but these estimated parameters would be useless for
the prediction of nonvoters’ behavior, as long as these questions were posed to voters only.
Because data availability is so crucial for the estimation of Pr(y∗ = i), further specification
is transferred to the application.
Here, the general outline of the model for estimating the representation gap ends. So
far the discussion shows that the estimation of the representation gap requires only two
quantities: maximum turnout and nonvoters’ counterfactual probability of voting for party
i. As soon as both quantities are estimated, the other steps are deterministic; one just needs
the required information. The formulas show which information is needed in addition to
the estimated quantities: the apportionment method A(x) (which also requires information
about the number of seats to be distributed), the absolute number of votes for all parties in
the real election (VVoteri ), the size of the barring clause (H), and the size of the electorate
(E). All these quantities are readily available for most if not all parliamentary elections.
Probability of government change
Equations (4)–(7) of subsection 2.1 can be formally concatenated to one single equation
which states that the probability of government change depends on the probability that
the counterfactual number of seats (S∗) of a specific party or coalition (P) is higher than a
threshold value τ , whereby the party or coalition and the threshold value are set according
to the realized government type G:
Pr(∆OG) = Pr
(
S∗P|G > τG
)
(15)
The previous section has outlined an estimation strategy for S∗i such that S∗i = Ŝ∗i + ui,
where ui reflects the uncertainty originating from the estimation of nonvoters’ counterfac-
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tual probability of voting for party i.4 Inserting Ŝ∗i+ui into equation (15) leads to
Pr(∆OG) = Pr
((
Ŝ∗P|G+uP|G
)
> τG
)
, (16)
which can be algebraically transformed to
Pr(∆OG) = Pr
(
uP|G >
(
τG− Ŝ∗P|G
))
, (17)
and, assuming that the error term is symmetric, to
Pr(∆OG) = Pr
(
uP|G ≤
(
Ŝ∗P|G− τG
))
. (18)
This equation shows that the probability of government change depends on the threshold
value, the estimated number of seats for party P, and the distribution of the error, u. Gen-
erally, the searched probability is given by the integral of the probability density function
of the error u:
Pr(∆OG) =
∫ Ŝ∗PG−τG
−∞
pdf(u)du (19)
To estimate this, one needs the estimation of Ŝ∗i outlined in the previous section and an
assumption about the distribution of the error term. However, as that error term is itself
a function of the assumptions about the error in the estimation Pr(y∗ = i), no additional
assumptions have to be made for the estimation of Pr(∆OG). It is only necessary to collect
the information about parliament size, the name of the winning party, and the type of
governing coalition that resulted from the real election.
3 Application
The method described earlier is now applied to all German national elections from 1949
to 2005. The major task of this application is the illustration of the method, so that the
interpretation of the results is limited to the description of the decisions that are necessary
when dealing with real empirical data. To further support the traceability of the presenta-
tion, the name of the Stata do-file that created a result is printed below each figure or table
and made publicly available on the Internet.5
3.1 Data
A data set about German elections has been compiled; it contains the following institu-
tional data for each German election since 1949:6
4 The reminder for uncertainty here is not equal to εi of equation (13), because that term undergoes the
transformations of the apportionment method as well. It is therefore denoted with a different symbol,
although formally ui = f (εi).
5 See http://www.wzb.eu/˜kohler/publications/
6 Stata do-file: crelections.do. Note that this do- file also creates the data for all state elections.
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• the size of the electorate, the absolute number of nonvoters, and the absolute num-
bers of second votes7 for all parties acquiring at least one vote (Statistisches Bunde-
samt 2005);8
• the absolute number of seats that each party is entitled to9 on the basis of the election
results (Statistisches Bundesamt 2005);
• the apportionment method, which changed from the Jefferson method to the Hamil-
ton method in 1987;
• the barring clause, which has been 5% since the beginning of the observation period,
but which was applied separately by states in the election of 1949, and separately
for eastern and western Germany in 1990; moreover, since 1953 parties of specific
ethnic minorities are exempt from the barring clause;
• the names of the parties that formed a coalition cabinet10 and the government type
(i.e., whether it was a single-party government, a winner’s coalition, a consent coali-
tion, or a minority government); so far, German governments have always been
formed through either a winner’s coalition or a consent coalition.
In addition to the institutional data on elections, data from the German National Election
Studies 1994–200211 provided by the data archive of the Leibniz Institute for the Social
Sciences (GESIS) have been used for estimating the parameters b of equation (13). The
German National Election Studies is a collection of survey data sets on German federal
elections. The collection contains data from both pre-election and post-election surveys.
Not all data sets of the collection were suitable for the present analysis. As a rule, data
from post-election surveys or from pre- election surveys very close to the election day
were preferred. The list of all studies used is in the appendix.
For the German federal election of 2005, data from the last round of the German branch
of the Comparative Study of Election Systems (CSES)12 have been used.
3.2 Voting behavior of nonvoters
A crucial step in the estimation of the representation gap and the probability of govern-
ment change is the prediction of the counterfactual election behavior of nonvoters. As
7 German election law gives each voter two votes. The first vote is for a candidate in a constituency,
the second vote is for a party list. The composition of parties in the parliament is decided (almost)
exclusively by the distribution of the second votes, and for this reason these votes have been used.
8 The source lists the respective numbers for all elections from 1949 to 2002. The results for
the 2005 election have been taken from the web page of the Bundeswahlleiter (http://www.
bundeswahlleiter.de/de/bundestagswahlen/BTW_BUND_05/downloads/).
9 The real number of seats can differ due to deputies moving from one party to another.
10 See http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Liste_der_deutschen_Bundesregierungen
11 For a description of the German National Election Studies see http://www.gesis.org/en/
services/data/survey-data/election-studies/german-federal-elections/
12 See http://www.umich.edu/˜cses/
PAGE 17
ESTIMATING THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF NONVOTERS
discussed in subsection 2.2, that estimation should be based on variables that are known
to be strongly connected with voting behavior and that are observed for voters and non-
voters. If we follow standard theories of voting behavior, obvious candidates are variables
such as partisanship, issue orientation, candidate orientation, and political ideologies. Un-
fortunately, such variables usually are not available in the surveys for the elections at the
beginning of the observation period.
An alternative approach to estimating the counterfactual voting behavior of nonvoters
is based on the theory of the politicized social structure. In a nutshell, this theory proposes
that political parties have been formed by cleavages between major social groups, and that
the parties have formed stable coalitions with the social group that they represent (Lipset
1960; Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Linz 1967; Pappi 1976, 2002). One implication of this
theory is that political behavior is largely structured by social groups. Despite the debate
on the possibly decreasing influence of social groups on voting behavior, there is little
doubt that there has been a politicized social structure for several of the decades of the ob-
servation period, particularly in Germany. There is also evidence that the decrease, if any,
has been less pronounced in Germany than in other countries (Pappi 1986). According
to Pappi and Shikano (2002), voter intentions derived from the politicized social structure
can be regarded as an operationalization of the normal vote, i.e., the hypothetical election
result based on long-term or middle-term influences. Insofar as the following estimations
of nonvoters’ counterfactual voting behavior are by and large based on social structural
variables, they reflect to a large extent nonvoters’ long-term voting predispositions.
The basic assumption behind estimating nonvoters’ political behavior is that they be-
have like voters who have the same social structural characteristics. One objection against
this strategy points to the well-established finding that German13 nonvoters are less inter-
ested in politics than are voters (Steinbrecher et al. 2007: 240–248), and that they also have
a lower degree of party identification (Steinbrecher et al. 2007: 218–228). These results
are problematic insofar as the underlying action theory of the politicized social structure
requires that actors have substantial knowledge about which party represents what inter-
ests. Obviously, these assumptions seem less justifiable for persons with low levels of
political interest than for persons with high levels of political interest. Any prediction of
nonvoters’ counterfactual behavior should therefore take into account the possibility that
the social structural position might play less of a role for persons with low levels of po-
litical interest. The prediction model below does this by using all two-way interactions
between the social structural variables and political interest. This approach has the effect
of muting class distinctions for persons with low levels of political interest. If the inter-
action is strong, it could help explain why studies show that increased turnout does not
automatically help the working-class parties (Fisher 2007).
Nonvoters’ counterfactual voting behavior was predicted for each national election sep-
arately by performing the following steps:
1. Estimation of b̂Voteri of equation (14). Based on data on voters only, a multinomial
logistic regression model (Long 1997) for reported voting behavior was estimated
13 These findings have been established for other countries as well (Powell 1986). However, the effect
seems to be particularly strong in Germany (Oppenhuis 1995: 59).
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for each survey separately. The independent variables were a list of social structural
variables, political interest, and all two-way interactions between political interest
and the social structural variables. Due to data limitations, the dependent variable of
that regression distinguished only between the two leading parties—the CDU/CSU
(Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union) and the SPD (Social Demo-
cratic Party)—and all other parties; the counterfactual vote proportion of the smaller
parties was estimated in step 4.
The social structural characteristics in the regression model were age, employment
status, occupational status of the main earner, education, region, marital status, and
denomination. Political interest is the self-assessed political interest or, if a self-
assessment is not available, an additive index of interests in political topics in the
mass media.14 Figure 1 shows the weighted proportions15 of the regression model’s
independent variables, which are based on the observations included in the regres-
sion model.
2. The vector of coefficients estimated in step 1 was used to predict the probabilities
among nonvoters of voting CDU/CSU, SPD, or for the other parties. This amounts
to applying equation (14) for i=CDU/CSU, SPD, and the other parties.
3. The averages of the individual probabilities of all nonvoters were taken to get non-
voters’ average probability of voting for party i, i.e., P̂r (y∗= i) of equation (11).
4. Finally, the vote proportions of the parties from the “Other” category were created.
For the sake of simplicity it was assumed that the nonvoters’ votes for other parties
are distributed proportional to the observed proportion of votes for each of these
other parties. Hence, the bigger parties in the “Other” category gain more of these
votes than do the smaller ones.
Figure 2 shows the results of these four steps. It displays the difference in vote propor-
tions between voters and nonvoters for the five most important German parties. Negative
values for a given party indicate that this party would have lost if nonvoters had partici-
pated in the election. The figure illustrates that nonvoters tend to be more in favor of the
SPD and less in favor of the CDU/CSU than are voters. In this sense, the SPD would have
gained if nonvoters had participated. However, it also turns out that the advantage for the
SPD is not constant across elections, and that other parties sometimes gain and sometimes
lose through the participation of nonvoters. Moreover, there is no obvious pattern in the
ups and downs of nonvoters’ support for parties.
14 The creation of the various variables is documented in the Stata do-file crbtwsvy.do.
15 Weighting was necessary due to the overproportional sampling probabilities of citizens in eastern Ger-
many in many surveys. The weighting variable is the reciprocal of the sampling probability in each state,
i.e.,
(
nstate
Estate
)−1
, with nstate being the number of observations in each state and Estate being the size of the
electorate in each state. As nstate×Estatenstate = Estate, the distribution of states in figure 1 is merely the relative
size of the electorates.
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Figure 2: Difference in vote proportions for parties between voters and nonvoters, with
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval
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The vertical capped lines in the figure show the 95% confidence intervals around the
plotted statistic. These confidence intervals have been estimated using a bootstrap method
(Efron and Tibshirani 1993). The correct interpretation of these intervals is that 95% of
the bootstrapped, average predicted probabilities of nonvoters differ between the upper
and lower value of the vertical lines from that of voters. Hence, the longer the vertical
lines, the more uncertain is the estimate of the difference in the voting behavior between
voters and nonvoters. Particularly for the SPD and the CDU/CSU, for which the model
predicts probabilities near 50%, the uncertainty of prediction is substantial—but realistic
given the amount of data. Judged by this bootstrapped confidence interval, the estimated
vote proportion for the SPD among the nonvoters is between 45 and 71% in 1972, which
is between 1 percentage point below and 25 percentage points above the real election
result. Later, when making projections about the probability of government change, we
take advantage of the uncertainty of these estimates (subsection 3.4).
The general finding that the SPD would by and large profit from the participation of
nonvoters mirrors the finding that nonvoters are typically from the lower-educated working
class. However, a large difference between the observed voting behavior of voters and
the estimated counterfactual behavior of nonvoters does not necessarily mean that the
SPD would receive a higher proportion of seats in the German Bundestag. At the very
minimum, this also depends on the proportion of nonvoters and on the question of whether
some of the smaller parties pass or fail the barring clause in the counterfactual election.
These questions will be dealt with in the next section.
The prediction model for the counterfactual voting behavior of nonvoters is a crucial
step in the estimation of the impact of nonvoters on election outcomes, and it is absolutely
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necessary to carefully examine the validity of these results. At the very least, the models
should have a reasonably good fit, and their coefficients should not contradict known em-
pirical relationships. These characteristics have been confirmed for the present prediction
models; the results of that analysis are available from the author.
3.3 Representation gap
After having established an estimation of nonvoters’ probabilities of voting for a specific
party, the next step is to produce the counterfactual distribution of seats. This step involves
an application of the formulas (11), (10), (9), and (8) in turn. The major difficulty is to
come up with an estimation of L̂, the proportion of the electorate that might additionally
participate in the election. The estimation of this quantity requires an estimation of T̂Max,
the turnout that could maximally be achieved. Kohler and Rose (2008) set T̂Max to the
average valid turnout of countries with strong enforcement of compulsory voting, which
was 86.9%. In Germany, however, the realized valid turnout was even higher than this
theoretical maximum for several elections. Therefore, the highest realized valid turnout,
which was 90.4% in 1972,16 is proposed here as a rough estimate of maximum turnout.
In the application of the apportionment rule, some particularities of German election
laws have to be considered. Table 1 lists these particularities and the solutions found for
producing the counterfactual seat distribution. To apply the apportionment methods, the
Stata program gprseats.ado has been developed and made publicly available on the
Statistical Software Components archive at Boston College. Feeding the vector of absolute
numbers of votes for each party into this program results in the counterfactual number of
seats for each party at each election. Figure 3 shows these results in comparison to the
realized number of seats. As in figure 2, dots are used to indicate the point estimates, and
vertical capped lines are used to indicate the 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 3 reveals that the participation of nonvoters would have resulted in minor to
moderate changes in the number of seats. The highest expected difference is observed for
1990, with a loss of nine seats for the CDU/CSU and a gain of nine seats for the SPD.
This results in a gross advantage of 18 seats for the SPD, which is still fairly small given
that the CDU/CSU won 319 and the SPD 239 seats in that election. Subsection 3.4 will
deal in more detail with the probability of government change given the differences in the
number of seats.
Most other displacements remain below five seats, and in the majority of cases it is just
one seat, more or less. Most of the effects of nonvoters’ participation work in favor of the
SPD, and in general the expected changes have become more accentuated since German
reunification in 1990. However, it should be noted that the size of the German parliament
has increased from 469 to 656 since that time, so that the same change in the absolute
number of seats has become less important.
A notable exception to the rule that the SPD would have gained most from nonvoters is
the first election after the Second World War, when other parties would have profited most
from the nonvoters. The 1949 election has been viewed as the last election of the Weimar
16 Officially reported turnout in 1972 was 91.1%, and the proportion of invalid votes was 0.73%.
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Problem Solution
Barring clause was applied separately in each
German state in 1949.
Nationwide application of the barring clause for
the real world and for the counterfactual election.
Hence, the counterfactual distribution of seats is
compared with a distribution of seats that would
have resulted from the realized election result if
the barring clause had been applied nationwide.
Barring clause was applied separately for western
and eastern Germany in 1990. The PDS, the suc-
cessor party of the East German communist party,
entered the parliament through this exclusionary
rule.
PDS votes were used in the apportionment
method regardless of their counterfactual nation-
wide election result in 1990.
According to the so-called Grundmandate rule,
parties winning at least three (until 1953: one)
direct mandatesa participate in the apportionment
of seats on the basis of second votes regardless of
the barring clause.
Parties that entered parliament through the
Grundmandate rule participate in the apportion-
ment regardless of their counterfactual election
result.
German election law allows so-called U¨berhang
seats, which are seats that a party could win in
addition to the seats determined through the ap-
portionment method.
U¨berhang seats were retained in the counterfac-
tual seat distribution.
a In Germany, voters have two votes. The important vote is the second vote, which determines the distri-
bution of seats. However, a candidate who wins the relative majority of votes in a specific constituency
enters parliament regardless of whether his or her party wins seats on the basis of the second vote; this is the
so-called direct mandate.
Table 1: Particularities of German election laws
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Figure 3: Change in seats in parliament from counterfactual participation of nonvoters
(∆Si) with bootstrapped 95% confidence interval
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Republic, in the sense that the party system of the new Federal Republic had not yet
consolidated. Several of the old parties of the Weimar Republic—such as the communist
KPD, and the Catholic Zentrum—still played an important role in that election, while the
interests of partisans of the Nazis remained orphaned.
The 95% confidence intervals in figure 3 resulted from the bootstrapped confidence
intervals as described in the previous section. Each of the 200 bootstrapped vectors of
nonvoters’ voting probabilities were entered into the process of generating the number of
seats. This procedure resulted in 200 “feasible” distributions of seats for each election,
and the plotted confidence intervals show the range of 95% of these feasible distributions.
Overall, the confidence intervals here appear to be much more moderate in size compared
to those shown in figure 2, for the most part because even large variations of nonvoters’
voting behavior tend to have moderate effects on the distribution of seats, particularly if
the number of nonvoters is small.
An overall measure for the disproportionality of the elections due to nonvoters can be
designed following Bernhagen and Marsh’s use of the Gallagher index of disproportional-
ity (equation (2)). The election-specific results of these calculations are given in figure 4,
which shows that the level of the German parliament’s disproportionality due to nonvoters
is rather small. The Gallagher index of disproportionality is below 2 for all but the 1949
and 1990 elections, which is about as low as what Bernhagen and Marsh (2007: 552) found
for the compulsory voting countries Australia and Belgium. For 1990, disproportionality
is around 4, which is similar to the United States; for 1949, it is almost as high as what
Bernhagen and Marsh report for Switzerland.
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3.4 Probability of government change
In section 2, it was argued that the changeability of government formation depends on
the type of the realized government. Of the four government types discussed, Germany
has so far predominantly been led by a winner’s coalition. The only periods without
governments based on a winner’s coalition were the first SPD/FDP coalition between 1969
and 1972 under Chancellor Willy Brandt, and the third and fourth SPD/FDP coalitions
between 1976 and 1983 under Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The two other government
types described above have not been formed in Germany thus far.
For winner’s coalitions, it was proposed that the conditions of government formation
change substantially if
• the winner changes hands,
• the realized coalition loses its absolute majority in the parliament, or
• the winning party achieves an absolute majority on its own.
This subsection provides estimates for the probability of each of these situations. These
estimates are based on the bootstrapped distribution of seats from the previous subsection.
The method used is explained in figure 5, which shows all 200 bootstrapped counterfactual
distributions of seats for the election of 2005. The counterfactual number of seats for each
party is shown as a stacked horizontal bar-chart (the bars are very thin). The number of
seats for the bourgeois block (the CDU/CSU and the FDP) is depicted with dark shadings,
while the seats for the Left parties are represented with bright shadings. A vertical line at
the number 308 indicates the number of seats necessary to form the government.
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The election of 2005 brought 226 seats for the CDU/CSU, 223 seats for the SPD, 61
seats for the FDP, 54 seats for the PDS/Linke, and 51 seats for the Green Party. As a
consequence, neither of the two major party blocks—the CDU/CSU and the FDP on the
one side, or the SPD and the Greens on the other side—won the 308 seats necessary to elect
the chancellor. As the former communist party PDS/Linke was not considered a possible
coalition partner by any of the other parties, the only possibility to form a government was
through the so-called “grand coalition” between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, which was
put into practice on November 22, 2005, by electing Angela Merkel as chancellor.
For the first instance of the bootstrap samples—indicated by the line at the very top
of the graph—the estimated number of seats is 222 for the CDU/CSU and 228 for the
SPD. Hence, according to this bootstrap sample, the SPD outpaced the real winner, the
CDU/CSU, suggesting a government led by the SPD candidate Gerhard Schro¨der rather
than by Angela Merkel. The question then becomes, how likely this case is. One answer
to this question which is in line with the theoretical concept of equation (19) points to
the proportion of bootstrapped seat distributions where the SPD has more seats than the
CDU/CSU. In the case of the 2005 election, this proportion is 90%. Hence, 90% of the
bootstrapped seat distributions are such that the SPD gains more seats than the CDU/CSU,
or, in other words, the estimated probability of the winner changing hands due to nonvoters
is 90%.
The probabilities of the two other situations can be estimated in a similar fashion. As
said, in 2005 the number of seats that was necessary to elect the chancellor was 308, and
the grand coalition actually won 449 seats. Looking at the results shown in figure 5, it
is fairly obvious that the combined number of seats of the grand coalition is greater than
the threshold of 308 in any instance of the bootstrapped samples. Hence, the estimated
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New winner Gov. coal. insuff. Winner suff. alone
Election P̂r(S∗R > S∗W ) P̂r(S∗C <
1
2S) P̂r(S
∗
W ∗ >
1
2S)
August 14, 1949 0 0 0
September 6, 1953 0 0 0
September 15, 1957 0 0 100
September 17, 1961 0 0 0
September 19, 1965 0 0 0
September 28, 1969 0 0 0
November 19, 1972 0 0 0
October 3, 1976 0 0 0
October 5, 1980 0 0 0
March 6, 1983 0 0 0
January 25, 1987 0 0 0
December 2, 1990 0 0 0
October 16, 1994 0 2 0
September 27, 1998 0 0 0
September 22, 2002 10 1 0
September 18, 2005 88 0 0
Table 2: Estimated probability of government change by election
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probability that the realized coalition would not have won enough seats when nonvoters
participated in the election is zero.17
Finally, there is the probability that the winning party of the counterfactual election
achieves the absolute majority on its own. Here, figure 5 shows that neither the CDU/CSU
nor the SPD comes even close to winning the absolute majority of seats throughout. There-
fore, the estimated probability that the counterfactual winning party achieves the absolute
majority of seats is zero.
To summarize the findings for 2005, there is a probability of 90% for another four years
of chancellor Gerhard Schro¨der if nonvoters had participated in that election. However, re-
gardless of nonvoter participation, the predecessor SPD-Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen coalition
would have been replaced by a grand coalition, as turned out to be the case in reality.
What are the estimates for the probability of government change for the other elections?
These figures are given in table 2, which shows in the first column of results the election-
specific estimated probabilities for the winner changing hands. The second column gives
the estimated probabilities for the realized coalition losing its majority, and the last column
the estimated probabilities for seeing a winner that gains an absolute majority on its own.
Most cells in table 2 are zero, indicating that in postwar Germany the probability of
17 Assuming that the PDS/Linke would not have been considered as a coalition partner for any of the other
parties, there is no other coalition besides the realized one that could gain enough seats in any of the
bootstrap samples.
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a change in government due to the participation of nonvoters has been negligible. In
fact, in only four cases do the results indicate that a different government due to nonvoter
participation was even algebraically feasible: the elections of 1957, 1994, 2002, and 2005.
The ability to identify the elections for which government change is impossible is one
of the great benefits of the technique proposed here, because it allows one to restrict the
discussion of potential alternative governments to the remaining cases. This is important
because such counterfactual prognosis requires further qualitative considerations of the
specific historical situation at the time of each election. The following discussion exem-
plifies this process of qualitative analysis by taking up the four outstanding German cases
mentioned above.
As discussed, the absence of electors helped Angela Merkel become chancellor in 2005.
The next nonzero probability is for the election of 2002, which shows a probability of
9% that the SPD and its candidate Gerhard Schro¨der would have been outpaced by the
CDU/CSU candidate Edmund Stoiber. It should be noted, however, that in all cases where
the counterfactual number of seats for the CDU/CSU is estimated to be higher than that
for the SPD, the envisaged bourgeois coalition did not gain enough seats to elect Stoiber
as a chancellor. In the (improbable) case that Stoiber would have outpaced Schro¨der,
he would have had to form a coalition with Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen in order to become
the chancellor; this seems very unlikely given the political debates at the time. Because
the SPD–Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen coalition retains the absolute majority of seats in any
instance where the winner changes hands, it is much more likely that this government
would have been formed anyway. It is therefore very unlikely that the participation of
nonvoters would have had any effect on government formation in 2002.
For election year 1994, there is a 5% probability that the realized coalition government
of the CDU/CSU and the FDP would not have won enough seats to elect Helmut Kohl as
chancellor. However, in all these cases, the formation of an alternative government would
have been quite difficult. Neither of the possible SPD-led two-party coalitions—with ei-
ther the FDP or the Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen—would have achieved an absolute majority.
In the (improbable) case of Kohl losing his majority through nonvoters’ counterfactual
participation, he would have been forced to form a grand coalition, or a coalition with
Bu¨ndnis 90/Die Gru¨nen. Because the latter must be regarded as very unlikely, I conclude
that there is a small but nonzero probability that the participation of nonvoters would have
led to a grand coalition in 1994.
Finally, table 2 shows a probability of 100% that the winning party of the counterfac-
tual election would have won the absolute majority of seats in 1957. However, this result
originates from the fact that Konrad Adenauer formed a coalition government with the
“Deutsche Partei” (DP), even though the CDU/CSU had already won the absolute major-
ity of seats (270 of the 497 seats). Although the participation of nonvoters would have
likely reduced the number of seats for the CDU/CSU (see figure 3), there is not one single
instance among the bootstrapped samples in which the CDU/CSU does not win the abso-
lute majority. In this sense, the conditions for government formation remain unchanged
under the counterfactual circumstances. It must therefore be concluded that the realized
coalition would have been formed anyway.
All in all, there is little evidence for the possibility of government change due to coun-
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terfactual participation of nonvoters. In most elections, the estimated probability of gov-
ernment change is zero. Of the four cases for which a nonzero probability of government
change has been estimated, only the elections of 1994 and 2005 show further qualitative
evidence that such a change might have occurred. For 1994 there is a small probability
that a grand coalition would have been formed instead of the realized CDU/CSU-FDP
coalition, and for 2005 it seems quite likely that the realized grand coalition would have
elected Gerhard Schro¨der as chancellor rather than Angela Merkel.
Summary
Conventional answers to the question of whether the counterfactual participation of non-
voters would have changed an election result make reference to the change in the division
of the vote resulting from adding the putative preferences of nonvoters to those of ac-
tual voters (see, e.g., Brunell and DiNardo 2004; Franklin 2004; Lutz and Marsh 2007).
Votes, however, are only an input to the determination of the policy-relevant outcomes of
an election. In a parliamentary system, the outcome of an election is the distribution of
seats in the parliament and the bargaining conditions for the formation of a government.
To understand the impact of nonvoters on this outcome, an explicit model of a multistage
process (Grofman et al. 1999: 364ff) is required.
This article has provided a detailed examination of the steps that are necessary to es-
timate the effects of nonvoters on the distribution of seats and on the probability of gov-
ernment change in a parliamentary system. To estimate the effects on the distribution of
seats, two estimates and a set of institutional and election-specific observations are re-
quired. The estimates are the counterfactual voting behavior of nonvoters, which could
be inferred from standard theories of voting behavior, and the maximum valid turnout.
The institutional observations are the particularities of the apportionment method, the bar-
ring clause, and the size of the parliament. Finally, the election-specific figures are the
absolute numbers of valid votes for each party at the real election, and the size of the elec-
torate. After all these quantities are obtained, the counterfactual distribution of seats can
be estimated by applying the respective formulas provided in subsection 2.2 of this article.
The estimation of the probability of government change due to nonvoters’ participation
requires the estimation of the counterfactual distribution of seats. Additionally, one has to
estimate the uncertainty of that estimation and to classify the realized government into one
of four different government types: single-party government, winner’s coalition, consent
coalition, or minority government. The formulas given in subsection 2.2 then allow one to
quantify the probability of a change in the conditions of government formation, which in
turn allows one to identify those elections in which the formation of a different government
could be quite likely, or at least possible.
The general model outlined in section 2 of this article has been applied in section 3 to
German national elections from 1949 to 2005. The empirical findings of that application
show that Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) would have gained most from the
counterfactual participation of nonvoters. However, the application also shows that the
level of disproportionality induced by nonvoting is not a constant feature of the German
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system. Disproportionality is fairly low for most German elections, but can become quite
substantial under specific conditions. So far, 1949 and 1990 have been the German elec-
tions with the highest level of disproportionality. Both elections have in common that they
are the first elections after a breakdown of an entire political system—the Nazi regime for
1949 and the communist regime for 1990.
In terms of the probability of government change, the empirical results show that so
far the counterfactual participation of nonvoters would most likely not have had a big
influence on government formation in Germany. Of all national elections since 1949, only
the elections of 1994 and 2005 show evidence that such a change could have happened.
For 1994, there is a small probability that a grand coalition would have been formed
instead of the realized CDU/CSU-FDP coalition, and for 2005 it seems quite likely that
the realized grand coalition would have elected Gerhard Schro¨der as chancellor rather
than Angela Merkel.
The fact that both the representation gap and the probability of government change vary
from election to election gives rise to the question of what lies behind this variation. There
are several possible explanations. Some of the more obvious ones are described by Kohler
and Rose (2008): the proportion of nonvoters, the distribution of votes in the realized
election results, the number of parties participating in the election, the differences in po-
litical preferences between voters and nonvoters, and the coalition preferences of parties.
However, it was not the goal of this article to deal with this question. An exploration of
this question is postponed to further work, though some initial steps have already been
taken: a data set with the required information for all German elections on the state level
has been created, a program has been written for applying the apportionment methods for
arbitrary election results; and a generalized program for estimating the effects of nonvoter
participation on the election outcome is under development.
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Appendix
ZA-Nr. Study Name Sampling Fieldwork Period Obs.
Election day 14 August 1949
2324 Wahlstudie 1949 Quota 01Feb49 –28Mar49 1000
2361 Situation nach der Btw 1949 Quota 15Aug49–31Aug49 1885
Election day 6 September 1953
0145 Wahlstudie 1953 (Bun-
desstudie)
Random 01Jul53 –31Aug53 2805
Election day 15 September 1957
3272-III Wahlstudie 1957 Quota 01Sep57 –14Sep57 1816
Election day 17 September 1961
0056 Wahlstudie 1961 (Ko¨lner
Wahlstudie)
Random 01Sep61 –16Sep61 1228
0057 Wahlstudie 1961 (Ko¨lner
Wahlstudie)
Random 01Nov61–31Dec61 1405
Election day 19 September 1965
0314 Wahlstudie 1965
(Nachunters.)
Random 01Oct65 –31Oct65 1141
0556 Wahlstudie 1965 (Vorunter-
suchung)
Random 01Sep65 –14Sep65 1302
Election day 28 September 1969
0426-II Wahlstudie 1969 (Panel) Random 17Oct69 –09Nov69 758
0525-II Wahlstudie 1969 (Politik in
der BRD)
Random 01Sep69 –27Sep69 855
Election day 19 November 1972
0635 Wahlstudie 1972 (Panel) Random 01Dec72–31Dec72 1221
Election day 3 October 1976
0823 Wahlstudie 1976 (Panel) Random 26Oct76 –19Nov76 1195
Election day 5 October 1980
1053-IX Politbarometer 1980
(September)
Random 01Sep80 –30Sep80 1409
1053-X Politbarometer 1980 (Octo-
ber)
Random 06Oct80 –30Oct80 999
Election day 6 March 1983
1276 Wahlstudie 1983 (Panel-
studie)
Random 07Mar83–31Mar83 1014
1281 Politbarometer 1983
(March)
Random 07Mar83–31Mar83 1032
Election day 25 January 1987
1536-II Politbarometer 1987 (Febru-
ary)
Random 01Feb87 –28Feb87 1986
1537-III Wahlstudie 1987 (Panel-
studie)
Random 06Feb87 –23Feb87 1311
Election day 2 December 1990
1920-XI Politbarometer 1990
(November)
RLD 01Nov90–30Nov90 939
1920-XII Politbarometer 1990 (De-
cember)
RLD 03Dec90–30Dec90 1035
1987-XII Politbarometer 1990 Ost
(December)
Random 03Dec90–30Dec90 1112
Continues on next page
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Continued from previous page
ZA-Nr. Study Name Sampling Fieldwork Period Obs.
Election day 16 October 1994
2546-IX Politbarometer 1994
(September)
RLD 01Oct94 –15Oct94 1116
2559-IX Wahlstudie 1994 (Polit-
barom. Ost)
Random 01Oct94 –15Oct94 906
2600 Vorw.-stud. 1994 Random 01Oct94 –15Oct94 2258
2601 Nachw.-stud. 1994 Random 17Oct94 –09Nov94 2033
3065-I Polit. Einst., polit. Part. u.
Wa¨hlerverh. i. verein. Dtld
1994
Random 12Sep94 –14Oct94 1844
3065-II Polit. Einst., polit. Part. u.
Wa¨hlerverh. i. verein. Dtld
1994
Random 24Oct94 –01Dec94 1783
Election day 27 September 1998
3066-I Polit. Einst., polit. Part. u.
Wa¨hlerverh. i. verein. Dtld
1994
Random 26Aug98–26Sep98 1506
3066-II Polit. Einst., polit. Part. u.
Wa¨hlerverh. i. verein. Dtld
1994
Random 08Oct98 –21Nov98 1417
3073 Dt. Nat. Wahlstudie -
Nachw.-stud. 1998 (Dt.
CSES-Studie)
Random 28Sep98 –17Oct98 2011
3160-IX Politbarometer 1998 (Sep-
38KW)
RLD 14Sep98 –20Sep98 1153
3160-X Politbarometer 1998 (Octo-
ber)
RLD 01Oct98 –30Oct98 1148
3160-XI Politbarometer 1998
(November)
RLD 01Nov98–30Nov98 1204
3160-XII Politbarometer 1998 (De-
cember)
RLD 01Dec98–30Dec98 1172
Election day 22 September 2002
3861-I Political Attitudes, Political
Participation and Voter (Vor-
wahl)
Random 12Aug02–21Sep02 1569
3861-II Political Attitudes, Politi-
cal Participation and Voter
(Nachwahl)
Random 01Oct02 –08Nov02 1545
Election day 18 September 2005
WZB Testmodul deutsche CSES
III
RLD 01Oct05 –30Oct05 2017
Do-file: anbtwsvydes.do
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